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The American people have always regarded education and
the acquisition of knowledge as matters of extreme
importance. We have recognized the public schools as a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government and as the primary vehicle for
transmitting the values on which our society rests
—Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)

I have a right. From where does this right
flow, how is it enforced and by whom, how do you know
when the right has been violated, what is the remedy
when it has been violated, and who shall effectuate that remedy?
How and why do people or groups invoke the language of rights in
public matters? These are but a few of the questions that come to
mind when an individual asserts a right.
It is a thorny path to follow when identifying and asserting
rights. Newman, in her 2013 University of Chicago Press book,
Realizing Educational Rights: Advancing School Reform through
Courts and Communities, picks her way carefully along this path,
studying and elucidating the obstacles, while remaining focused on
her destination: educational rights. We followed Newman on this
path and found our journey with her to be provocative and
enlightening.1
Stated succinctly, Newman (2013) asserts, “The right to
education is a necessary precondition to fair deliberative democracy” (p. 106). She builds her argument “for a right to education as a
matter of political equality” (p. 2) and proposes that “deliberative
democracy cannot be sustained without a robust right to education” (p. 3). In ways illustrative of the conceptual complexity of the
language and logic of rights, her treatment of educational rights is
procedural in both personal and political dimensions. The right to
education endorses equality among all participants while also
suggesting the very preconditions necessary for that participation.
1 The Education Law Association selected Newman’s book to receive the
Steven S. Goldberg Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Education
Law.
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Newman’s (2013) book proceeds in two parts. The
first explores political philosophy and historical events to
describe the conceptual shape of assertions of the right to
education. In the second, through two case studies, she
applies dual lenses to empirical findings. She first adopts
a legal lens to the right to education by analyzing the
Kentucky case Rose v. Council for Better Education
(1989) as an example of how school finance litigation in
a state court is used to assert a right to education. She
then concludes with a second lens, highlighting efforts
of advocacy conducted by community organizations
toward a realized right to education.

Part One: Educational Rights in Theory
Deliberative democracy is built upon a foundation of citizens in
possession of the ability to deliberate in meaningful ways. In the first
half of her book, Newman (2013) posits that deliberative democracy
must protect the right to education as a sustaining ideal. Of course,
one might imagine that a deliberative body, through democratic
processes, could curtail a number of the resources available to
disadvantaged citizens. While acknowledging that this exercise of
majoritarian politics is certainly possible, deliberative democracies
must provide sufficient safeguards to prevent this from happening
in relation to certain lynchpin institutions, education being chief
among them. Newman observes the precariousness of this protection, writing: “but as I emphasize . . . , democratic bodies are at best
unreliable guardians of the rights of all students, and at worst they
are the source of grave injustices” (p. 51).
Her preference for equality of access to the political process
through recognition of a right to education is evident in her analysis
of political theorists such as Gutmann and Thompson. Newman
notes, positively, that both authors give attention to the educational
implications of their engagement with deliberative theory.
Following Gutmann, Newman (2013) asserts that educational
entitlements are hugely vulnerable when structured in absolute
deference to the processes of democratic deliberation. Allowing
deliberative bodies the “discretion to decide what constitutes an
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adequate education . . . provides little protection for the interests of
educationally disadvantaged citizens” (p. 15). Therefore, Newman
limits democratic authority so as to preserve the essence of
deliberative democracy itself. She asserts that “rights claims
constrain what democratic bodies may decide” (p. 114). Specifically,
the right to education protects an individual’s entitlement to an
education from the vicissitudes of (likely, educationally advantaged) democratic majorities.
If education is an issue of right, institutional mechanisms must
exist to support that right in the face of challenges. As government
is often called to act “to protect our interests or rights from interference from others” (Sullivan, 2005, p. 2), Newman (2013) endorses a
recognized U.S. Constitutionally protected right to education. This
opportunity to protect the right to education was presented to the
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez (1973) but, to Newman’s disappointment, the Court
declined to find that education was a fundamental right deserving
of the highest level of judicial scrutiny. “The Court was not convinced that education is the most important social good for
realizing citizen’s political liberties” (p. 55).
Newman’s (2013) argument for the importance of a “satisfactory minimal education” (p. 55) for all citizens is strong. Citizens
who lack education are likely to be marginalized in and through the
political process. “Education is intimately connected to individual’s ability to participate in collective decision making as civic
equals” (p. 86).
In line with this, Newman (2013) finds that a right to education requires cognitive autonomy as a buffer against political
manipulation. “Citizens who are cognitively autonomous have the
analytical skills to evaluate the veracity of political rhetoric” (p. 36),
and “An education requires critical openness to new evidence and
ideas” (p. 38).
Her requirement for intellectual flexibility is reminiscent of
the Supreme Court in the classic student armband case, Tinker v.
Des Moines Community School District, (1969), and she writes, “In
our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments
that are officially approved.” (Newman, 2013, p. 506). That is to say,
an education for a sufficient degree of autonomy frees individuals
to critique the democratic proposal being presented—a point
worthy of consideration alongside the concern of the Supreme
Court in Tinker, in which education just reflects the governmental position.

Part Two: Educational Rights in Practice
Newman (2013) explores the themes of the second half of her text in
two sections: (a) the equity and adequacy legal argument of the
Rose v. Council for Better Education (1989) case involving the public
school finance scheme of Kentucky and (b) the San Francisco
community organization Coleman Advocates for Children and
Youth. Rose casts an adequate education as a legal right enforceable
by the power of the courts through review of the public funding
scheme that supports the education of the State’s youth. The
Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth case study reviews
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education as an aspirational right, using hortatory rather than legal
power to recognize and enforce the right.
The discussion of the Rose (1989) case is an intriguing choice.
While lamenting the San Antonio Independent School District
(1973) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Newman (2013) turns
to the state courts to find a legal right to an education. Rose signals
a fundamental shift in the requirement for how a state supports a
public education for all of its citizens. Starting with the California
Supreme Court case Serrano v. Priest (1971), courts judged whether
a state meets its educational constitutional obligation to its youth
by ascertaining whether the funding scheme is equal across salient
differences. Rose set a new course by asking whether the Kentucky
funding mechanism for public education was adequate to meet the
requirements of its constitution. Public funding distributed
throughout Kentucky may be equally distributed, but it may also
be inadequate in providing the level of education needed to meet
constitutional standards for an educated citizenry, the court
reasoned. Newman argues that court decisions, like Rose, that
focus on the adequacy of the education its youth receive, are “a
necessary precondition for a just deliberative democracy.
Education is intimately connected to individuals’ ability to
participate in collective decision making as civic equals” (p. 86).
What the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to deliver, the state courts
provide by defining the education necessary for all citizens,
thereby affirming the importance of education to the political
health of the community.
Newman (2013) steers her second case study of advocacy for
educational rights through community-based democratic politics.
She places two arrows in the quiver of her argument for education
as a right for all citizens. The first, as discussed above, is the legal
arrow. Her second arrow is the persuasiveness in the political arena.
Thus, she advances two separate lines of arguments for realizing a
right to education.
Absent a legal anchor for the foundation of a right to education, Newman (2013) stresses that the right to education, while
aspirational, is rooted in deservingness. Because of our humanity,
education is a right “just by virtue of being people” (p. 94). Equal
opportunity to receive resources and access, through education, to
full participation in society is a prioritized entitlement that trumps
the popular will when it seeks to diminish the individual entitlement. Aspiration confronts majoritarian principles on the conceptual level; thus, the imprimatur of the law may act as a collaborative
argument for the aspirational assertion of a right to an education.
Newman (2013) continues the conversation about the place,
force, and right of education. She clearly identifies the dynamic
tension between the role of an autonomously educated citizen,
which both supports deliberative democracy but also provides the
counterbalance to the potential excesses of majoritarian rule. In
this, her argument is especially well structured.
Newman (2013) has engaged legal scholars, political theorists,
and educational philosophers in a meaningful and thoughtful manner about the intersection of the educational autonomy of the
individual and the majoritarian principles of deliberative democracy. This is the tension she seeks to define and to resolve.
Democracy is dependent upon an educated citizenry, but what are
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the boundaries of the democratic processes influence on that
education? Toward an answer, Newman cuts a supremely useful
and navigable path.
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